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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Kevin Scott Dias appeals from the district court’s judgment entered upon 
his guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver.  
Dias claims the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.    
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
Officer Miller observed a Honda Accord fail to come to a complete stop at 
a stop sign.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 3, Ls. 6-24.)  Officer Miller initiated a traffic stop.  (Id.)  
Officer Miller made contact with Dias, the driver of the Honda Accord.  (9/3/14 
Tr., p. 4, Ls. 5-25.)  Officer Miller noticed that Dias was acting extremely nervous.  
(9/3/14 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 7-17.)  Dias’ hands were shaking and his breathing rate was 
greatly accelerated.  (Id.)   
Dias admitted that he had been in trouble for “pot” before.  (9/3/14 Tr., p 
7, Ls. 2-7.)  Arlee Dias, Dias’ wife, was sitting in the front passenger seat.  
(9/3/14 Tr., p. 5, L. 18 – p. 6, L. 3.)  Dispatch informed Officer Miller that Arlee 
Dias had two confirmed misdemeanor warrants.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 19-24.)  
Officer Miller arrested Arlee Dias.  (Id.)   
 Officer Miller asked Dias to step out of the car because Dias was acting 
nervous and Officer Miller wanted to make sure Dias did not have access to a 
weapon.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 7, L. 25 – p. 8, L. 10.)  Officer Miller asked for permission 
to search Dias, and Dias consented.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 11-15.)  Officer Miller 
found a knife and a large lump in Dias’ left pocket.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 16-24.)  
Officer Miller asked if he could remove the large lump and Dias said that he 
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could.  (Id.)  The large lump turned out to be a large wad of cash, approximately 
$1,000.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 8, L. 25 – p. 9, L. 5.)   
 Officer Miller asked Dias if he could search the car.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 
17-21.)  Dias consented to Officer Miller’s request.  (Id.)   
[Officer Miller]: Is there anything in that car I need to be aware 
of tonight man, no weed or nothing like that, 
anything illegal? 
 
[Dias]:   No.  
 
[Officer Miller]: Is it okay if I just take a quick look at it, look 
inside?  Is that cool? 
 
[Dias]: Yeah. 
 
[Officer Miller]: Alright, I appreciate that.  We’ll keep the 
money up there for now and I’ll put your uh 
wallet on top of it so don’t go away, ok?  Just 
hang tight for me, if there’s nothing in the car 
this should be pretty quick.  I appreciate it. 
 
(R., p. 104 (citing Ex. 2 at 13:29-13:52).)   
 
Officer Miller first looked at the driver’s seat area, and then he looked to 
his right and saw a black fanny pack behind the driver’s seat.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 9, L. 
24 – p. 10, L. 13.)  The black fanny pack was sitting on the back seat within 
arm’s reach of the driver’s seat.  (Id.)  Inside the black fanny pack, Officer Miller 
found two separate small Ziploc baggies containing what appeared to be 
methamphetamine, two larger Ziploc baggies that appeared to contain “spice” 
and another Ziploc baggie that contained Oxycodone.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 10, L. 14 – 
p. 11, L. 1.)  Officer Miller also found several empty Ziploc baggies, a 
hypodermic syringe and a digital scale.  (Id.)  Officer Miller placed Dias under 
arrest.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 7-13.)  Officer Miller found more cash in Dias’ wallet 
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and in the car Officer Miller found additional methamphetamine and 
paraphernalia.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 11, L. 18 – p. 13, L. 4.)   
The state charged Dias with possession of methamphetamine with the 
intent to deliver, possession of oxycodone with the intent to deliver, possession 
of a synthetic cannabinoid (a.k.a. “spice” or “potpourri”) with the intent to deliver 
and misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.  (R., pp. 45-46, 51-52.)  
 Dias filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized by Officer Miller.  (R., 
pp. 82-87.)  Dias argued that Officer Miller exceeded the scope of Dias’ consent 
when Officer Miller opened the fanny pack in Dias’ car.  (Id.)  The state objected.  
(R., pp. 90-93, 97-101.)  At the hearing on the motion to suppress the parties 
stipulated to use the preliminary hearing transcript as the factual basis.  (3/27/15 
Tr., p. 5, L. 4 – p. 6, L. 17.)  The state also submitted a copy of Officer Miller’s 
audio recording.  (3/27/15 Tr., p. 36, Ls. 2-22; R., p. 102; Ex. 2.) 
The district court denied Dias’ motion to suppress.  (R., pp. 102-110.)  The 
district court determined that Officer Miller did not exceed the scope of Dias’ 
consent because “[i]t is clear that prior to asking to take a ‘quick look’ in 
Defendant’s car, Officer Miller explicitly inquired whether there was ‘weed’ or 
anything ‘like’ weed in the car.”  (R., p. 109.)  While the district court noted that 
Officer Miller should have been more precise in his language, “it is clear from the 
context that Officer Miller intended to search Defendant’s vehicle for ‘weed’ or 
anything ‘like that.’”  (Id.)  And “a reasonable person would likely have 
understood that Officer Miller was going to search for ‘weed’ or anything ‘like 
that’ in the car.”  (Id.)  The district court concluded that Officer Miller did not 
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exceed the scope of Dias’ consent when he searched the fanny pack and found 
drugs.  (Id.)   
Therefore, the Court finds that even though Officer Miller asked to 
take a “quick look” in Defendant’s car, he did not exceed the scope 
of Defendant’s consent by searching in the fanny pack, because (1) 
a reasonable person would have understood from the exchange 
that Officer Miller intended to search for drugs, and (2) Defendant 
did not limit the scope of his consent.  
 
(R., p. 110.) 
  
Dias entered a guilty plea but reserved the right to appeal the district 
court’s denial of his motion to suppress.  (R., pp. 116-117.)  Dias pled guilty to 
Count I – possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, and the state 
dismissed the remaining counts.  (R., pp. 115-126.) 
The district court entered judgment and sentenced Dias to ten years with 
two years fixed.  (R., pp. 130-134.)  The district court retained jurisdiction.  (Id.)  
Dias timely appealed.  (R., pp. 136-140.)  After his period of retained jurisdiction, 
the district court suspended the sentence and placed Dias on probation.  (R., pp. 
149-156.)   
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ISSUE 
 
Dias states the issue on appeal as: 
 
 Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Dias’ motion to suppress?  
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Dias failed to show the district court erred when it denied his motion 
to suppress?   
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ARGUMENT 
 
Dias Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Held That Officer 
Miller Did Not Exceed The Scope Of The Consent Granted By Dias 
 
A. Introduction 
Officer Miller asked Dias whether there was “weed” or anything “like” weed 
in the car.  (See R., pp. 104, 109.)  Officer Miller then asked if he could take a 
quick look inside the car.  (Id.)  Dias consented.  (Id.)  Officer Miller searched a 
black fanny pack he saw on the backseat, behind the driver’s seat.  (R., p. 104.)  
The district court found that “[b]ased on the context of the interaction between 
Officer Miller and Defendant, a reasonable person would likely have understood 
that Officer Miller was going to search for ‘weed’ or anything ‘like that’ in the car.”  
(R., p. 109.)  On appeal, Dias has failed to show the district court clearly erred 
when it held that Officer Miller did not exceed the scope of the consent granted 
by Dias.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.  State v. 
Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006).   
 Whether a consent to a search was voluntary is a question of fact, the 
determination of which is reviewed on appeal for clear error.  State v. Reynolds, 
146 Idaho 466, 472, 197 P.3d 327, 333 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Stewart, 145 
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Idaho 641, 648, 181 P.3d 1249, 1256 (Ct. App. 2008).  “Findings will not be 
deemed clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial evidence in the 
record.”  Stewart, 145 Idaho at 648, 181 P.3d at 1256 (quoting State v. Jaborra, 
143 Idaho 94, 98, 137 P.3d 481, 485 (Ct. App. 2006)). 
 
C. Officer Miller Did Not Exceed The Scope Of Dias’ Consent Because A 
Reasonable Person Would Have Understood That Officer Miller Was 
Going To Search For “Weed” Or Anything “Like That” In Dias’ Car   
 
A warrantless search conducted pursuant to valid consent does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 
(1973) (citations omitted); State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 
(2001).  Consent is valid if it is free and voluntary.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225-
26 (citations omitted).  The voluntariness of an individual’s consent is a question 
of fact to be determined based upon the totality of the circumstances.  Varie, 135 
Idaho at 852, 26 P.3d at 35 (citing Schnleckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49).  In order to 
be valid, consent cannot be the result of duress or coercion, either direct or 
implied.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248.   
Officer Miller asked Dias if he could search Dias’ car.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 
17-21.)  Dias consented to Officer Miller’s request.  (Id.; see also R., p. 104 
(citing Ex. 2 at 13:29-13:52).)  On appeal, Dias does not argue that Officer Miller 
engaged in improper duress or coercion.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-15.)  Nor 
does Dias claim his consent was invalid.  (See id.)  Instead, Dias argues that 
Officer Miller exceeded the scope of the consent granted by Dias.  (See id.)  
Specifically, Dias argues that his consent to search his car did not extend to a 
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search of closed containers in his car because Officer Miller only asked to “take 
a quick look[.]”  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-8.)   
The district court rejected this same argument.  It found that “Officer Miller 
explicitly inquired whether there was ‘weed’ or anything ‘like’ weed in the car.”  
(R., p. 109.)  Further, “based on the context of the interaction between Officer 
Miller and [Dias], a reasonable person would likely have understood that Officer 
Miller was going to search for ‘weed’ or anything ‘like that’ in the car.”  (Id.)  Dias 
has failed to show the district court erred.   
“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the 
Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness-what would the typical 
reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and 
the suspect?”  Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (citing Illinois v. 
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-189 (1990); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501-
502, (1983) (opinion of WHITE, J.); id., at 514, (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting).  
The United State Supreme Court explained, “The scope of a search is generally 
defined by its expressed object.”  Id. (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 
(1982)).  “A reasonable person may be expected to know that narcotics are 
generally carried in some form of a container.”  Id.  “Contraband goods rarely are 
strewn across the trunk or floor of a car.”  Id. (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 820.)  
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Here, Officer Miller asked Dias if he could search the car.  (9/3/14 Tr., p. 
9, Ls. 17-21.)  He did so in the context of inquiring if there was “weed” or 
something “like that” in the car.1  (See R., p. 104 (citing Ex. 2 at 13:29-13:52).)   
[Officer Miller]: Is there anything in that car I need to be aware 
of tonight man, no weed or nothing like that, 
anything illegal? 
 
[Dias]:   No.  
 
[Officer Miller]: Is it okay if I just take a quick look at it, look 
inside?  Is that cool? 
 
[Dias]: Yeah. 
 
[Officer Miller]: Alright, I appreciate that.  We’ll keep the 
money up there for now and I’ll put your uh 
wallet on top of it so don’t go away, ok?  Just 
hang tight for me, if there’s nothing in the car 
this should be pretty quick.  I appreciate it. 
 
(R., p. 104 (citing Ex. 2 at 13:29-13:52).)  A typical reasonable person would 
have understood from this exchange that Dias consented to Officer Miller quickly 
searching his car for “weed” and things “like that.”  “Weed” was the expressed 
object of Officer Miller’s request to search.  A reasonable person may be 
expected to know that “weed” is generally carried around in some form of a 
container.  Contraband, including “weed” is rarely strewn across the trunk or floor 
of a car.  
Dias argues that “the totality of the circumstances would not lead a 
reasonable person to believe that Mr. Dias consented to a search of the 
                                            
1 Officer Miller asked the question in the negative, but the import is the same.  
Officer Miller was asking if there was “weed” or anything “like” weed in the car.  
(See also R., pp. 109-110.)   
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containers in his car.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)  Dias argues that Officer Miller’s 
questions where not specific and “did not indicate that Officer Miller would 
conduct a targeted search for drugs.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)  Dias’ argument is 
contradicted by the fact that Officer Miller “explicitly” inquired about “weed” 
immediately prior to asking to search the car.  (See R., pp. 109-110.)   
Dias also argues that when the officer asked to take a “quick look” he was 
only asking for permission to “scanning the interior of the car for whatever is 
readily observable” and this request did not include a request to “touch” things in 
the car.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-9.)  As pointed out by the United States 
Supreme Court, “[a] reasonable person may be expected to know that narcotics 
are generally carried in some form of a container” and are “rarely strewn across” 
the floor of a car.  See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.  Based upon the 
explicit object of Officer Miller’s search, namely “weed,” it defies logic to think 
that Officer Miller was only going to scan the car for what was readily visible.  A 
reasonable person would think that Officer Miller was going to search for “weed” 
which would include searching containers.  Further, it would not make any sense 
for Officer Miller to ask for consent to “scan[] the interior of the car for whatever 
is readily observable” because Officer Miller could already do that from outside 
the car without consent under “plain view.”  See e.g. State v. Allgood, 98 Idaho 
525, 527, 567 P.2d 1276, 1278 (1977) (“The plain view doctrine has been 
applied in cases in which officers standing on public property looked in car 
windows[.]”) (citation omitted).   
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 Contrary to Dias’ argument on appeal, the Tenth Circuit decision in United 
States v. Wald, 216 F. 3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2000), does not inform the analysis in 
this case.  In Wald, the officer asked if he could “take a quick look in the vehicle.”  
Wald, 216 F.3d at 1224-1225.  The officer searched the trunk of the car, and 
then unscrewed the speakers in the trunk and found methamphetamine hidden 
in the speakers.  Id.  The Tenth Circuit held that Wald did not consent to the 
officer searching the trunk of his car.  Id. at 1228-1229.  Wald is distinguishable 
from this case.  Here, Officer Miller’s search, in contrast to the search in Wald, 
was pretty quick.  Officer Miller first looked at the driver’s seat area, and then he 
looked to his right and saw a black fanny pack behind the driver’s seat.  (9/3/14 
Tr., p. 9, L. 24 – p. 10, L. 13.)  This is a very far cry from opening the trunk and 
unscrewing the speakers.  See Wald, 216 F. 3d at 1224-1225.   
More importantly, absent in Wald was any indication that the officer told 
Wald that he was going to search the car for drugs.  See id.  In contrast, Officer 
Miller “explicitly” inquired about “weed” immediately prior to asking to search the 
car.  (See R., pp. 109-110.)  Further, Wald’s interpretation of a “quick look” is in 
the minority.  See Alexander A. Mikhalevsky, The Conversational Consent 
Search: How “Quick Look” And Other Similar Searches Have Eroded Our 
Constitutional Rights, 30 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1077, 1090 (2014).  (“Aside from 
Wald, very few federal cases have interpreted a suspect’s consent to a 
conversational search request as a limited authorization to search absent a 
suspect’s objection or other facts indicating the consent only extends to a 
specific area.”) “By and large, the primary view taken by federal courts is that a 
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suspect’s consent to a quick look search authorizes the officer to perform a full 
search.”  Id. at 1094. 
Instead of looking to the minority position held by the Tenth Circuit, this 
Court should look to the Idaho Court of Appeals decision in State v. Frizzel, 132 
Idaho 522, 975 P.2d 1187 (Ct. App. 1999).  In Frizzel the officer asked Smith, 
the driver of the car, if there were any weapons or drugs in the car.  Id. at 523, 
975 P.2d at 1188.  Smith gave consent to search.  Id.  Behind the passenger 
seat, the officer found a blue backpack, opened it, and found marijuana and 
$1,600 in cash.  Id.  The Idaho Court of Appeals found the officer did not exceed 
the scope of consent because the officer asked about weapons and drugs and 
“[a] typical reasonable person would have viewed the scope of Smith’s consent 
to include that which could hold either weapons or drugs.”  Id. at 524, 975 P.2d 
at 1189.   
In the instant case, the officer testified that he inquired whether 
there were any weapons or any drugs in the vehicle. The officer 
then asked for and received Smith’s consent to search. Smith, by 
her consent, did not limit the scope of the search in any manner. A 
typical reasonable person would have viewed the scope of Smith’s 
consent to include that which could hold either weapons or drugs. 
 
Id.  The same analysis controls the outcome here.  Officer Miller asked if Dias’ 
car had any drugs in it and Dias consented to a search.  Officer Miller did not 
exceed the scope of Dias’ consent.   
 The district court also noted that a defendant’s failure to object to the 
continuation of the search is an indication that the search was within the scope 
of the initial consent.  (See R., pp. 109-110.)  Dias argues that the district court 
erred because, under Wald, the requirement to object only applies to a “general 
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consent” to search.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-15.)  It does not make sense 
to limit the requirement to object to a “general consent”2 search.  It is well 
established that the standard for measuring the scope of consent is what the 
typical reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the 
officer and the suspect.  See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251.  If the subject 
gives consent, but then objects during the search, then a reasonable person 
would have understood that the subject did not consent to that portion of the 
search.  If, on the other hand, the subject grants consent to search, and does not 
object during the search, then a reasonable person would have understood that 
the officer did not exceed the scope of the search.  Creating an arbitrary 
distinction between “general consent” and “non-general consent” would 
undermine the reasonableness of the existing standard for measuring the scope 
of consent.   
 Dias also argues that the district court did not make any “factual findings” 
regarding whether Dias could have objected.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-15.)  The 
district court found:  
Further, case law is clear that if a defendant does not object to the 
continuation of a search (especially under these circumstances 
where the officer said he was going to take a “quick look”), then the 
defendant’s failure to object is an indication that the search was 
within the scope of the initial consent.  
 
(R., p. 110.)  The district court found that Dias “did not limit the scope of his 
consent.”  (See R., pp. 109-110.)  With these findings from the district court it is 
                                            
2 It is not clear what would be considered a “general consent” versus a “non-
general consent.”   
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not clear why Dias believes it was further necessary for the district court to make 
additional findings regarding where Dias was standing when Officer Miller 
searched the car.   
 The district court correctly summarized the conversation between Dias 
and Officer Miller: 
It is clear that prior to asking to take a “quick look” in Defendant’s 
car, Officer Miller explicitly inquired whether there was “weed” or 
anything “like” weed in the car.  Immediately after, Officer Miller 
asked to take a “quick look” at the inside of the car.  Defendant 
responded, “yeah.”  Officer Miller then responded, “Alright, I 
appreciate that.  We’ll keep the money up there for now and I’ll put 
your uh wallet on top of it so don’t go away, ok?  Just hang tight for 
me, if there’s nothing in the car this should be pretty quick.  I 
appreciate it.”  Based on the context of the interaction between 
Officer Miller and Defendant, a reasonable person would likely 
have understood that Officer Miller was going to search for “weed” 
or anything “like that” in the car. 
 
(R., p. 109.)  Dias has failed to show the district court clearly erred when it held 
that Officer Miller did not exceed the scope of Dias’ consent.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the 
district court.   
 DATED this 9th day of June, 2016. 
 
       
 __/s/ Ted S. Tollefson____ 
 TED S. TOLLEFSON 
 Deputy Attorney General 
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